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On Universality of Classical Probability with Contextually Labeled Random Variables:
Response to A. Khrennikov
Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov1, ∗ and Maria Kon1
1Purdue University
In his constructive and well-informed commentary, Andrei Khrennikov acknowledges a privileged
status of classical probability theory with respect to statistical analysis. He also sees advantages
offered by the Contextuality-by-Default theory, notably, that it “demystifies quantum mechanics
by highlighting the role of contextuality,” and that it can detect and measure contextuality in in-
consistently connected systems. He argues, however, that classical probability theory may have
difficulties in describing empirical phenomena if they are described entirely in terms of observable
events. We disagree: contexts in which random variables are recorded are as observable as the vari-
ables’ values. Khrennikov also argues that the Contextuality-by-Default theory suffers the problem
of non-uniqueness of couplings. We disagree that this is a problem: couplings are all possible ways
of imposing counterfactual joint distributions on random variables that de facto are not jointly dis-
tributed. The uniqueness of modeling experiments by means of quantum formalisms brought up by
Khrennikov is achieved for the price of additional, substantive assumptions. This is consistent with
our view of quantum theory as a special-purpose generator of classical probabilities. Khrennikov
raises the issue of “mental signaling,” by which he means inconsistent connectedness in behavioral
systems. Our position is that it is as inherent to behavioral systems as their stochasticity.
KEYWORDS: classical probability, contextuality, contextual labeling, quantum formalisms, ran-
dom variables.
In our target paper (Dzhafarov & Kon, 2018) we argued
that classical probability theory (CPT) is a universally ap-
plicable mathematical language, unfalsifiable by empirical
phenomena or substantive theories. We considered sev-
eral phenomena claimed to pose difficulties for CPT, and
showed that these difficulties only arise if one misidentifies
the random variables used to describe these phenomena.
We pointed out a general way of preventing the possibility
of such misidentifications: contextual labeling of random
variables. We contrasted the universality of CPT with sub-
stantive, special-purpose theories aimed at deriving prob-
ability distributions for specific empirical situations. We
view quantum formalisms as such a special-purpose the-
ory (or set of models, if applied outside quantum mechan-
ics). Khrennikov’s (2019) commentary further strengthens
our view of CPT by mentioning that statistical analysis of
data is “fundamentally based” on CPT. In the target paper
we mention this too: “Any prediction derived in a special-
purpose theory [...] can be (and always is, eventually) fully
expressed in the language of CPT, making it possible to
relate the prediction to empirical data.”
1. IS CPT INADEQUATE IF ONE STICKS TO
OBSERVABLE EVENTS?
However, Khrennikov still thinks that CPT has problems
with certain empirical situations, such as the double-slit
experiment in quantum physics. He asserts “the impossi-
bility of defining a Kolmogorov probability space which is
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based solely on experimentally verifiable events.” Thus, he
says, in the double-slit experiment CPT can describe the
situation in each of the contexts defined by which slit is
open and which is closed, but “it is impossible to repre-
sent observables with respect to these contexts in the same
Kolmogorov probability space without introducing unob-
servable events.” Perhaps this comment is prompted by
the fact that in the target paper (and, in greater detail,
in Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2018) we presented a contextuality
analysis of the double-slit experiment that used unobserv-
able events, such as “particle hits the detector having passed
through left open slit.” This, however, is an optional analy-
sis that in no way replaces the basic CPT description of this
empirical situation. In this basic description, one considers
the random variable
R =
{
+1 = the particle hits the detector
−1 = the particle did not hit the detector
, (1)
with both values being entirely observable, and their prob-
abilities being empirically estimable. By the general princi-
ple we advocated in the target paper, this random variable
should be labeled by its context, which is also entirely ob-
servable:
c =


1 = both slits are closed
2 = only the left slit is open
3 = only the right slit is open
4 = both slits are open
. (2)
We have therefore four distinct random variables Rc (c =
1, . . . , 4), stochastically unrelated to each other. Their dis-
tributions cannot be specified unless we make physical as-
sumptions, and it is these physical assumptions that can
agree or disagree with the experiment. Thus, one can make
the physical assumption that
Pr
[
R1 = +1
]
= 0, (3)
2i.e., the particle cannot hit the detector if both slits are
closed. It is, as we know, empirically correct, but this is a
physical prediction rather than one of CPT. One can make
another physical assumption,
Pr
[
R4 = +1
]
= Pr
[
R2 = +1
]
+ Pr
[
R3 = +1
]
, (4)
and this one is known to be empirically false. This fact
was interpreted by Feynman (1951) as a violation of the
additivity law for probabilities, and Khrennikov seems to
concur. We consider this a mistake, because CPT in no
way constrains the probability distributions of R2, R3, R4
in (4). The issue, once again, is one of correctly identifying
random variables, and contextual notation (involving, we
emphasize, only observable contexts) is a general way to
prevent mistaken identification.
2. IN CPT, CONTEXTUAL LABELING CANNOT
BE CIRCUMVENTED
Khrennikov presents our Contextuality-by-Default
(CbD) theory as just one possible approach within the
framework of CPT. We cannot but agree, if one takes the
CbD theory in its entirety. We think, however, that the
departure point of CbD, that all random variables should
be labeled not only by what they measure or respond to
but also by the contexts in which they are recorded, is a
logical necessity.
Khrennikov’s exposition of the CbD theory is preceded
by an analysis that contravenes this requirement. He con-
siders a set of random variables A1, A2, B1, B2 such that we
have joint distributions for pairs (Ai, Bj) (i, j = 1, 2), but
not for all four of them.1 He calls these random variables
“observables,” but it is clear from Footnote 2 of Khren-
nikov’s commentary that by an “observable” Khrennikov
means a random variable in the normative CPT sense (as
opposed to, say, Hermitian operators or POVMs in quan-
tum theory, that are also called “observables”). However, if
A1, A2, B1, B2 are classical random variables, the situation
considered by Khrennikov (following many other authors)
is logically impossible.
In CPT, random variables are jointly distributed if and
only if they are defined on the same domain probability
space. If X and Y are defined on a probability space S,
and if Y and Z are defined on a probability space S ′, then
S ′ = S. Otherwise, we will have a mathematical impossi-
bility of one and the same random variable (here, Y ) de-
fined on two different domains. But then X,Y, Z are all
1 The reader having difficulties in reconciling the notation used in the
present note with that in Khrennikov’s commentary (and with the
notation used in the target article) may consult Appendix, where
the correspondences are spelled out. Regrettably, Khrennikov did
not keep his mathematical notation close to one in the target pa-
per, forcing us here to adopt “bridging” notation, both resembling
Khrennikov’s and acceptable in the CbD theory, even if not opti-
mal.
defined on the same probability space S and are, there-
fore, jointly distributed. Applying this simple reasoning to
A1, A2, B1, B2, if any three of the pairs
(A1B1) , (B1, A2) , (A2, B2) , (B2, A1) (5)
are jointly distributed, then all four random variables are
jointly distributed.
Suppose, however, that Alice records a joint distribution
of (X,Y ), Bob records a joint distribution of (Y, Z), and
Charlie, who gets the results from both Alice and Bob,
finds from some trustworthy theory that (X,Y, Z) cannot
be jointly distributed. What should Charlie conclude? The
only way of dealing with this situation is to treat it as a
reductio ad absurdum case: Charlie has arrived at a math-
ematical impossibility, whence there should be a mistake
made in the initial assumptions. If there can be no doubt
that the joint distributions of (X,Y ) and (Y, Z) exist, and if
the “trustworthy theory” in question cannot be doubted ei-
ther, the only remaining possibility is that it was a mistake
to assume that Y in Alice’s (X,Y ) and Y in Bob’s (Y, Z) is
one and the same random variable. Since (X,Y ) and (Y, Z)
are measured separately (in different contexts), it is per-
fectly possible that we have in fact (X,Y ) and (Y ′, Z) with
Y and Y ′ being distinct random variables. This would be
obvious to Charlie if Y and Y ′ measured different things or
responded to different questions (in the CbD terminology,
if they had different contents). This would also be obvious
to Charlie if the distributions of Y and Y ′ were different.
However, Charlie can be “fooled” into confusing Y with Y ′
if they have the same content and the same distribution:
in this case the contradiction arrived at by Charlie is the
only guide in deciding that Y and Y ′ are distinct random
variables.
In the CbD theory, the possibility of erroneously assum-
ing Y = Y ′ is precluded by “automatically” defining the
identity of a random variable by both its content and its
context. So we have
(
X1
1
, Y 1
2
)
for Alice, two random vari-
ables in the same context c = 1, distinguished from each
other by their different contents (q = 1 and q = 2); and we
have
(
Y 22 , Z
2
3
)
for Bob, provided his Y has the same con-
tent (q = 2) as Alice’s Y . Now there is no possibility of a
mistake, as Y 12 and Y
2
2 are not the same random variable.
Charlie can meaningfully ask, however, whether
(
X1
1
, Y 1
2
)
and
(
Y 2
2
, Z2
3
)
can be coupled in a special way, in particular,
if there is a coupling
(
X˜11 , Y˜
1
2 , Y˜
2
2 , Z˜
2
3
)
in which Y˜ 12 = Y˜
2
2
with probability 1. The affirmative answer to this ques-
tion would mean that the naive substitution of (X,Y ) and
(Y, Z) for the rigorously defined
(
X1
1
, Y 1
2
)
and
(
Y 2
2
, Z2
3
)
is
relatively innocuous: it can be viewed as an informal sim-
plification that, with some care, leads to no confusion. If,
however, a coupling
(
X˜1
1
, Y˜ 1
2
, Y˜ 2
2
, Z˜2
3
)
with Y˜ 1
2
= Y˜ 2
2
does
not exist, then the naive treatment is misleading and con-
fusing.
Returning to the CHSH-related situation focused on by
Khrennikov, in the CbD theory we “automatically” have
to describe it by eight random variables grouped into four
3jointly distributed pairs,(
A11, B
1
1
)
,
(
B21 , A
2
2
)
,
(
A32, B
3
2
)
,
(
B42 , A
4
1
)
. (6)
Consider the situation when this system is consistently con-
nected, i.e., when the distributions of the content-sharing
random variables (those denoted by the same letter and the
same subscript, e.g., A22 and A
3
2) are identical. Rather than
ignoring the contexts (superscripts), which, as we know,
may lead to a contradiction, in the CbD theory we con-
sider this system’s couplings
A˜1
1
, B˜1
1
, B˜2
1
, A˜2
2
, A˜3
2
, B˜3
2
, B˜4
2
, A˜4
1
, (7)
defined as sets of jointly distributed random variables that
respect all the probabilities that characterize the corre-
spondingly labeled random variables in (6). The question
we ask in the CbD theory is whether among these couplings
we can find ones in which, with probability 1,
B˜11 = B˜
2
1 , A˜
2
2 = A˜
3
2, B˜
3
2 = B˜
4
2 , A˜
4
1 = A˜
1
1. (8)
Such a coupling is called maximally connected, and if it ex-
ists, the system is noncontextual. Otherwise it is contextual.
3. IS NON-UNIQUENESS OF COUPLINGS A
PROBLEM?
Khrennikov’s account of the CbD theory, using the ex-
ample (6) above, is fairly accurate, except for his assertion
that the random variables in (6) are jointly distributed.
In the CbD theory, the random variables belonging to dif-
ferent contexts are stochastically unrelated, i.e., they have
no joint distribution. It is the couplings (7) subject to (8)
that impose all possible joint distributions on the eight ran-
dom variables in (6). For all practical purposes, however,
Khrennikov’s imprecision here is relatively innocuous. In-
stead of speaking of four stochastically unrelated pairs of
random variables, Khrennikov speaks of eight jointly dis-
tributed variables about which we only know joint distribu-
tions within same-context pairs. The overall joint distribu-
tion then should be treated as unknown (and unknowable,
because different contexts are mutually exclusive). Instead
of different couplings, then, one would speak of different
possibilities for this unknown joint distribution.
The only problem with this language is that the existence
of one “true” but unknown joint distribution is disconcert-
ing. What could this distribution be? Khrennikov indeed
finds fault with the CbD theory in this respect. “How can
one select the ‘right coupling’?” he asks, and suggests a
substantive interpretation for our inability to find one, in
the spirit of the Copenhagen school of quantum mechanics:
perhaps, he says, it is due to the fact that “real physical
(or psychological) contextuality is determined not only by
semantically defined observables, but also by apparatuses
used for their measurement.”
We think that the answer is much simpler: there is no
“right coupling” because couplings are not part of a system
of random variables being coupled. Couplings are imposed
on a system like (6) rather than found in it. They formalize
the answer to the following counterfactual question: while
in reality the different pairs in (6) are stochastically unre-
lated, what could their joint distribution be if they were
jointly distributed? The set of all possible couplings of a
system characterizes this system, in the same way as the set
of all factors of an integer characterizes this integer. We do
not think of the multitude of the factors as a deficiency of
number theory or our ignorance of one “true” factor. One
should also keep in mind that in CbD analysis we are in-
terested not in all possible couplings but only in special,
maximally connected ones. By definition, if a system is
contextual no such couplings exist. So, the non-uniqueness
problem here does not arise.
Khrennikov contrasts the non-uniqueness of couplings
in the CbD theory with the uniqueness of quantum for-
malisms: “[Quantum probability] does not suffer the non-
uniqueness problem. There is one fixed quantum state
given by a normalized vector ψ, or generally by a density
operator ρ; and there is the unique representation of ob-
servables by Hermitian operators.” This is consistent with
our view of quantum formalisms as special-purpose compu-
tations aimed at generating probability distributions, in the
classical sense of the latter term. The uniqueness in ques-
tion is achieved at the price of making additional assump-
tions about a system being studied, leading to empirically
falsifiable predictions.
The following example, a modification of one given in a
conference paper by Robert Griffiths (Griffiths, 2018), may
serve as an illustration. Consider the system
A1 B2 c = 1
B′2 C3 c = 2
q = 1 q = 2 q = 3
. (9)
Irrespective of the row-wise distributions, this system is
noncontextual, and it generally has an infinity of max-
imally connected couplings. Suppose now that that
{A1, B2, B
′
2
, C3} are generated by quantum measurements
of q = 1, 2, 3 in some fixed quantum state. In particular,
invoking the no-disturbance principle, B2 and B
′
2
are iden-
tically distributed. Then either the joint distribution of the
four random variables with B2 = B
′
2
exists uniquely (if the
Hermitian matrices generating A1 and C3 commute), or it
does not exist (if they do not commute). We have no mul-
titude of possible joint distributions here, but only because
we have made additional assumptions about the origins of
the random variables.
4. ON “MENTAL SIGNALING”
Khrennikov correctly points out that the main advan-
tage of the CbD conceptualization is its natural extendibil-
ity to inconsistently connected systems, i.e., those in which
content-sharing random variables in different contexts may
have different distributions. In relation to the system (6),
the extended definition is that the system is noncontextual
4if it has a coupling (7) in which each of the equations in
(8) holds with maximal possible probability (constrained by
the marginal distributions of the random variables). This
makes the CbD theory especially applicable to behavioral
systems, most if not all of which are inconsistently con-
nected. Khrennikov uses the term “mental signaling” to re-
fer to this inconsistency, because “signaling” is the technical
term used for inconsistent connectedness in some physical
systems. He points out that inconsistently connected sys-
tems are also abundant in quantum physics, for a variety of
reasons. (Khrennikov, in fact, was instrumental in bring-
ing this issue to the attention of experimental physicists.)
However, most physicists would agree that inconsistent con-
nectedness can be greatly reduced or altogether eliminated
by better experimental designs and greater control over
experimental arrangements. In this relation Khrennikov
poses a question of whether or not the same may be true
for the ubiquitous inconsistent connectedness of behavioral
systems. He writes: “In psychology the situation is more
complicated. There are no theoretical reasons to expect
no signaling. Therefore, it is not obvious whether signal-
ing is a technicality or a fundamental feature of cognition.
[...] it may be that mental signaling is really a fundamental
feature of cognition.”
We think the latter is definitely the case. Psychological
experiments share with quantum physical experiments the
fundamental presence of stochasticity in responses to stim-
uli (measurements of properties). Regardless of how strictly
these stimuli (properties) are controlled, stochasticity in the
responses (measurements) cannot be reduced by nontrivial
amounts. In addition, however, psychological experiments
exhibit the property of non-selectivity in responses to sev-
eral stimuli: when the task is to respond to stimulus x
and to respond to stimulus y, then x almost always, if
not always, influences the distribution of responses to y,
and vice versa (Cervantes & Dzhafarov, 2018; Dzhafarov,
Zhang, & Kujala, 2015). In this respect behavioral systems
differ from some quantum physical systems, those in which
quantum theory includes “no-signaling” or “no-disturbance”
constraints. These constraints, however, do not apply to all
quantum physical systems (see, e.g., a CbD analysis of the
Leggett-Garg-type systems in Bacciagaluppi, 2016, and a
CbD analysis of the double-slit experiment in Dzhafarov &
Kujala, 2018).
5. CONCLUSION
Khrennikov’s commentary is a constructive and even
sympathetic analysis of our views on CPT with contextual
labeling of random variables. The sympathy in the com-
mentary can be easily understood: Khrennikov has him-
self advocated variants of contextual labeling of random
variables, with some publications well preceding the CbD
theory (Khrennikov, 2009a, 2009b, 2015a, 2015b). In this
note we have discussed those aspects of Khrennikov’s com-
mentary that allowed us to further elucidate our positions
on CPT and the conceptual advantages of the CbD theory.
Khrennikov defends some of the CPT inadequacy claims by
bringing up the observability-of-events restriction. We have
disagreed: contexts are observable too. Khrennikov uses
noncontextual indexation of random variables and intro-
duces contextuality as non-existence of a global distribution
of a set of random variables whose overlapping subsets are
jointly distributed. We have argued that this widespread
description leads to contradictions that can only be avoided
by labeling all random variables contextually. Khrennikov
points out a problem of non-uniqueness faced by the CbD
theory in finding couplings for systems of random variables.
We have argued that this is not a problem because the var-
ious joint distributions imposed by couplings do not exist
in the same sense as the random variables being coupled.
Rather, the couplings are counterfactual, describing all pos-
sible ways in which variables that are de facto stochastically
unrelated could be related to each other if they were jointly
distributed. Finally, we have supported Khrennikov’s as-
sumption that inconsistent connectedness in behavioral sys-
tems is inherent and irreducible.
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APPENDIX: NOTATION
In the target paper we use the usual CbD notation Rcq for
a random variable measuring, or responding to q = 1, 2, . . .
in context c = 1, 2, . . .. Thus, R23, e.g., is a random vari-
able with content q = 3 in context c = 2, and this uniquely
identifies it within a system of random variables being con-
sidered. In this note Rcq will be replaced with A
c
q and B
c
q ,
so that the content of a random variable is now identified
by both its subscript and the letter A or B. This is done
to bring the notation closer to Khrennikov’s use of Aqq′
and Bq′q, when he refers to the CbD theory, to designate
random variables recorded in context that he denotes by
c = (aq, bq′). Khrennikov’s own (noncontextual) notation
for random variables is aq, bq (not to be confused with the
use of the same symbols when he refers to the CbD the-
ory: there aq, bq are not random variables). This may be
confusing, but the choice was not ours. In this note, when
we speak of noncontextual notation (considered incorrect
in the CbD theory), we use Aq, Bq.
Khrennikov focuses on systems of random variables that in
the CbD theory are called cyclic systems of rank 4. Their
notation choices here are as shown:
R1
1
R1
2
c = 1
R2
2
R2
3
c = 2
R3
3
R3
4
c = 3
R4
1
R4
4
c = 4
q = 1 q = 2 q = 3 q = 4
target paper,
normative in CbD
A11 B11 C11 = (a1, b1)
B12 A21 C21 = (a2, b1)
A22 B22 C22 = (a2, b2)
A12 B21 C12 = (a1, b2)
a1 b1 a2 b2
Khrennikov,
when referring to CbD
a1 b1 c = (a1, b1)
b1 a2 c = (a2, b1)
a2 b2 c = (a2, b2)
a1 b2 c = (a1, b2)
a1 b1 a2 b2
Khrennikov’s own,
noncontextual
A1
1
B1
1
c = 1
B2
1
A2
2
c = 2
A32 B
3
2 c = 3
A41 B
4
2 c = 4
a = 1 b = 1 a = 2 b = 2
present note,
acceptable in CbD
A1 B1 c = 1
B1 A2 c = 2
A2 B2 c = 3
A1 B2 c = 4
a = 1 b = 1 a = 2 b = 2
present note,
when referring to Khrennikov’s
noncontextual notation
